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Financial Stability and Public Policy: An Overview 
 
Saibal Ghosh1 
 
The paper reviews the sources of market failure in financial institutions and markets and 
what can be done to alleviate them. It examines game-theoretic explanations for 
financial instability, in particular the role of asymmetric information in generating 
destabilizing behavior. In the area of remedies, the paper analyses the potential 
contribution of official safety nets and what can be done to minimize the associated 
moral hazard. It discusses the role of public policy in this context.  
 
 
I. Introduction 
A considerable amount of discussion has been generated in recent times 
on the issue of financial stability. It is now well recognized that the safeguarding 
financial stability is of central importance to the effective functioning of a market 
economy. It provides the basis for rational decision-making about the allocation 
of real resources through time, and in the absence of imperfections in the real 
sector, improves the climate for savings and investment. To exemplify, in Mexico 
what began as a currency crisis, eventually turned into a serious recession and 
created huge strains on the banking system, further exacerbating the recession 
and via the tequila effect, subsequently had systemic ramifications in several 
emerging economies. The absence of stability creates damaging uncertainties 
that can lead to resource misallocation and reduce the willingness of agents to 
enter into inter-temporal contracts. Maintaining stability is therefore a key 
objective of financial intermediaries.  
As a starting point, a distinction needs to be made between monetary 
stability and financial stability. Monetary stability can broadly be defined as the 
stability of the general price level; financial stability, on the other hand, refers to 
the smooth functioning of institutions, markets and infrastructure. Although there 
can be important common elements between the forces making for instability in 
the price level and fragility in the financial system, the two phenomena are not 
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the same. The principal focus of the survey will be financial stability, that is, the 
stable functioning of the intermediaries and markets that constitute the building 
blocks of the financial system. 
One can distinguish between two main sorts of financial instabilities: 
instabilities in institutions and instabilities in markets (Crockett, 1997). 
Institutional instability exists when ‘failure of one or a few institutions spreads and 
causes more widespread economic damage’. Market instability, on the other 
hand, is defined ‘in terms of the wider impact that volatility in asset prices and 
flows can have on the economy’. These apart, another potential source of 
instability, which has gained prominence in recent times, has been instabilities 
associated with disruptions to market infrastructure.2 
Earlier, the occurrence of periodic episodes of financial turmoil was 
attributed to external shocks or various forms of aberrant behaviour 
(Kindleberger, 1978). However, recent interest in financial stability, both from the 
theoretical standpoint as well as from the policy angle, has been driven by two 
major considerations. Firstly, advancements in finance have provided a coherent 
macroeconomic foundation about the observed phenomena of financial 
instability. From the policy perspective, the growth and integration of world 
financial markets and the systemic repercussions that idiosyncratic failures might 
engender, have increased the importance of policy actions to safeguard financial 
stability. 
Having outlined the various types of instabilities, the rest of the essay will 
proceed as follows. The first part will review the various reasons that have been 
advanced why institutions should be particularly prone to instability. The second 
part examines the issue of instabilities in markets. The third section examines 
instabilities in market infrastructure. The subsequent section considers the 
possible responses. How can official actions make markets work better, or 
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exchange transaction typically take place at different times, and in different markets., so that the gap 
between the issuance of initial payments instructions and final settlement of the transaction is longer than in 
domestic payment systems. 
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otherwise, reduce the potential for instability? Answers to these questions lie at 
the core of the quest for a safe, efficient, reliable and resilient financial system. 
The final Section contains the concluding remarks. 
 
II. Sources of Instability 
For a considerable period of time, the two standard explanations 
propounded to explain episodes of financial distress were characterized as 
cyclical and monetarist. The cyclical school of thought (Kindleberger, 1978) 
focused on the various forces making for cyclical excess. The process was 
usually initiated when some favorable event leads to a bidding up of asset prices. 
Such a phenomenon was more likely to occur if a substantial period elapsed 
since the last crash and the underlying pecuniary motive gathered momentum. In 
such a situation, a rise in price leads to further buying in anticipation of a 
continuation in the current price trend (bandwagon effect). Eventually, when 
prices reach overvalued levels or some external event occurs that shatters the 
confidence in the system, prices collapse, inducing a downward spiral, so that 
financial intermediaries, whose portfolios are financed by borrowing, are badly 
affected. 
The monetarist view (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963), on the other hand, 
contends that financial instability is not likely to arise or become serious in the 
absence of a disruption in money supply. In this view, it is monetary policy 
mistakes that either initiate financial instability or engenders disruptions. 
Schwartz (1986), in particular, has labeled as ‘pseudo-financial’ crises those 
disturbances that are not accompanied by a significant decline in the quantity of 
money. 
Neither of these explanations appear to be entirely satisfactory. The 
Minsky hypothesis of cyclical excesses leaves an uncomfortable burden to be 
borne by irrational behaviour, unsupported by any underlying rigorous 
microeconomic foundation. The monetarist view, although more self-contained 
theoretically, is rather limited in its approach since it does not explicitly internalize 
the possibility of disturbances arising from non-monetary factors.  
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Recent advances in game theory and the economics of decision-making 
under uncertainty have offered more satisfactory explanations as to why agents 
act in ways that produce instability in financial institutions. These insights have 
also provided strong microeconomic underpinnings to the earlier works. In what 
follows, attention will first be paid to the sources of instability in financial 
intermediaries and next, to what gives rise to volatility in asset prices. 
 
II A. Fragility in Financial Institutions 
Role of Financial Intermediation 
Advances in the theory of asymmetric information have provided 
significant insights regarding the vulnerability of financial intermediaries to a 
sudden loss of confidence. Asymmetric information gives rise to the problems of 
adverse selection, moral hazard and ex-post verification (Van Damme, 1993). In 
the market for loans, the asymmetric information process ensures that borrowers 
are relatively well-informed about the risk-return characteristics of the projects 
vis-à-vis the lenders. Adverse selection therefore serves to ensure that a 
disproportionate number of ‘bad’ (risky) projects are presented for financing, 
leading to the phenomenon of credit rationing by lenders. 
When such problems become acute, there might not be any price at which 
buyers and sellers are willing to trade, given the uncertainty about the quality of 
the goods being traded. Such a situation necessitates an institutional mechanism 
to overcome this informational asymmetry. In the financial sector, such a 
mechanism is a financial intermediary. The idea is that financial intermediaries 
can exploit economies of scale and scope in monitoring borrowers on behalf of 
investors and thereby reduce the cost of finance. 
Left to itself, this begs the question as to who monitors the monitor? How 
do investors establish the quality of banks? The insight provided by Diamond 
(1984) was to argue that banks could overcome this infinite regress problem by 
holding a portfolio of loans. Portfolio diversification eliminates the risk of investing 
in a single project and enables banks to offer depositors standard debt contracts, 
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which offer a fixed return. Judged thus, depositors can arbiter banks merely in 
terms of whether they offer the going rate of return. 
 
‘Runs’ on Financial Intermediaries 
The vulnerability of banks results from the interaction of liabilities that are 
relatively more liquid than assets. Asymmetrically informed depositors may 
become nervous about the solvency of their banks or they may become nervous 
about other depositors’ nervousness and about the possibility that those other 
depositors may withdraw their deposits from the bank, thereby impairing the 
liquidity of the first group of depositors. Such fears and anticipations can lead to 
depositor runs, which could cause premature closure of even solvent banks and 
cold be contagious among banks. In essence, depositors face a ‘Prisoners 
Dilemma’ problem, with each deposit withdrawal imposing negative externalities 
on other depositors. Mention may be made in this context of the fact that, prior to 
the ‘thirties, the US banking system suffered periodic banking panics and crisis, 
involving depositor runs, culminating in the banks runs of the early 1930s that led 
to the closure of over 9,000 banks between 1930 and 1933 (White, 1999). 
 
Asset Quality Problems 
If the dynamics of financial runs have become better understood as a 
result of advances in economic theory, what are the factors initiating episodes of 
financial instability? Fears of loss of liquidity sustain and intensify runs, but what 
causes the erosion of confidence in the first place? Typically, banks get into 
trouble because of deteriorating asset quality. They lend to activities that 
generate significant profits during boom times, but turn out to be vulnerable when 
underlying economic conditions become unfavourable. Recent writings have 
revealed the systematic influence of other phenomena, related to debt deflation, 
disaster myopia, herd behaviour, perverse incentive structure, principal-agent 
problem and negative externalities. 
The debt deflation theory (Fisher, 1933) contends that a shock to a highly 
indebted economy, implying significant default on interest and repayment 
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obligations, can generate distress sale of assets, declining asset prices, 
consequent falls in general wages and prices, rising real debt burdens, calling-
back of loans, contagious bank failures and a collapse of overall economic 
activity. In effect, excessive debt and deflation reinforce each other and drive the 
economy into a downward spiral.  
Disaster myopia3 (Guttentag and Herring, 1984) occurs when lenders’ 
assessment of the potential distribution of economic outcomes (subjective 
probabilities) differs from reality (objective probabilities). Disaster myopia can 
occur for a variety of reasons. For example, disastrous outcomes might occur so 
frequently that it is might prove impossible to assign with a reasonable degree of 
certainty any meaningful probability to the future occurrence of the event. 
Alternately, changes in policy regimes could push economic conditions well 
beyond the boundaries that were factored into account when the decisions were 
first made. In such circumstances, financial intermediaries may not find it 
worthwhile devoting scarce management time to analyzing such eventualities. In 
their view, such disasters are expected to engender countervailing action by the 
authorities designed to stave of its consequences.  
A third aspect of lending action that gives rise to difficulties is what is 
referred to as herd behaviour (Banerjee, 1992). Herd behaviour can be a 
manifestation of irrationality, but it can also reflect rational maximization under 
uncertainty. The fact that others are lending may be considered as invaluable 
information concerning the creditworthiness of a potential borrower. And 
importantly, managerial performance is generally judged relative to some market 
benchmark. The disincentives for being wrong in company are generally much 
less than for being wrong in isolation. 
A fourth type of problem arises from the fact that management 
compensation structures can generate perverse incentives, which in turn, is an 
aspect of the principal-agent problem. Such problems arise because those who 
make financial decisions are compensated in ways not fully congruent with the 
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(Davis, 1999). 
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success of their investment decisions. So, if an economic agent receives a 
handsome bonus if an investment is successful, but suffers no more than 
temporary loss of employment, if his decision adversely affects the employer, it 
would be rational for such an agent to favour high risk-return strategies vis-à-vis 
strategies with reasonable risk-return profiles.  
The final aspect of asset quality problems arises from negative 
externalities. Negative externalities arise when some of the costs of an agent’s 
decisions accrue to outsiders. Such externalities are often a pertinent feature, 
particularly of the banking industry because of the relatively small cushion of own 
funds relative to total balance sheet size. The smaller the net worth of the bank, 
the less is the probability that its owners have to lose from adverse outcomes 
and the more inclined they are to pursue high-risk strategies or ‘gamble for 
resurrection’ (Dewartipont and Tirole, 1994). 
 
Contagion 
Another reason why the financial industry is often thought to be 
particularly prone to systemic instability is because of the possible vulnerability to 
failure contagion across institutions. Contagion effect are often a significant 
feature of the financial sector than otherwise for two main reasons. Firstly, there 
is a network of interlocking claims and liabilities through the inter-bank market 
and the payments and settlements system. These have become more 
pronounced and increasingly dominant in recent years, with the growing 
integration of national and international capital markets (Goodhart, 1998a). 
Secondly, informational asymmetries make it more difficult for creditors to 
correctly judge the strength of a financial institution on the basis of publicly 
available information. As a result, creditors may therefore be inclined to presume 
difficulties at one institution as indicative of potential vulnerability at other 
institutions with similar business structures. More importantly however, bank 
failure contagion is liable to (a) occur faster; (b) spread more broadly (“domino” 
effect), (c) result in a larger number of failures, and (d) result in significant losses 
to creditors.  
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Resolution Costs 
Last, but not the least, the costs that fall on the public budget provides the 
most persuasive evidence of the need to take public policy actions to strengthen 
financial systems. The most prominent example of this pertains to the US S&L 
debacle of the 1980s, the resolution costs of which are estimated anywhere 
between 2 and 4 percent of GDP. These numbers however pale in comparison to 
the costs incurred in a number of other countries.  
 
Table 1: Costs of Resolving Banking Sector Crises in Selected Economies 
Country (Period of crisis) Estimate of cost/losses 
(per cent of GDP) 
Latin America Economies  
Argentina (1980-82) 13-55 
Mexico (1994-95) 12-15 
African Economies  
Cote d’ Ivorie (1988-91) 25 
Senegal (1988-91) 17 
Asian Economies  
Sri Lanka (1989-93) 9 
Malaysia (1985-88) 5 
Transition Economies  
Bulgaria (1990s) 14 
Hungary (1995) 10 
Industrial Economies  
Spain (1977-85) 17 
Japan (1990s) 10 
United States (1984-91) 5-7 
Source: Goldstein (1996) and World Economic Outlook (1998). 
 
In France, the losses incurred by a single bank, Credit Lyonnais, are 
placed at around USD 30 billion, or over 2 percent of GNP. Honohan (1997) 
estimates the fiscal costs of resolving crisis in developing countries alone as 
being as much as USD 250 billion. Recent studies have placed the resolution 
costs of such crises anywhere between 5 to 55 per cent of GDP (Table 1). The 
resolution costs of these crises often falls on the banking system, and it the 
system is state-owned, on the government. As Sundarrajan and Balino (1991) 
has observed, in such situations, the use of public money to support distressed 
institutions often endanger efforts to rein in budget deficits. And even if budget 
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deficits are viewed as (domestic) transfers rather than as real economic costs, it 
can compel the authorities towards less benign ways of deficit financing (e.g., an 
inflation tax); the rescue process itself can wean the incentives for creditors to 
monitor the behaviour of banks in the future. 
 
II B. Fragility in Markets  
Instability in markets, i.e., excessive volatility of asset prices, can be a 
matter of just as much concern. The two markets in which instability has been 
most disconcerting and therefore subject to serious economic analysis have 
been the foreign exchange and the equity markets. These apart, instability in 
other markets, such as in real estate market has an important factor for the 
transmission of distress in the financial system, as evidenced from the recent 
experiences in South-East Asia (Bank for International Settlements, 1997 and 
1998). 
 
Foreign Exchange Market  
Foreign exchange market instability can be divided into two main types. 
The first takes place in a managed exchange regime when a discrete change in 
the currency’s external value takes place4. This is usually described as a 
currency crisis. The second occurs in a floating exchange rate situation, when 
the amplitude of fluctuations in the market exchange rate exceeds that which can 
be explained on the basis of underlying fundamentals. This is usually coined as 
volatility. 
A currency crisis occurs when market participants lose confidence in the 
sustainability of the currency’s current exchange rate and seek to reduce their 
exposure denominated in that currency. The most common explanation offered 
for such a crisis is that the authorities of the country concerned have sought to 
peg their exchange rate at a level that is incompatible with the underlying macro 
policies. While the exchange rate may be maintained for a certain period through 
                                                          
 
3 Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1998) have quantified such a discrete change as a nominal depreciation 
of the currency of at least 25 per cent.   
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the use of reserves or otherwise, eventually the weight of market opinion 
implores that a change in the exchange rate is unavoidable. This position has 
however, not gone unchallenged. Several authors (Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz, 1993) have suggested that the exchange rate market may be subject to 
multiple equilibria. In such a setup of pegged exchange rates, so long as the 
exchange rate peg is considered ‘credible’, the evolution of domestic factor costs 
is consistent with external equilibrium. However, once a change in the exchange 
rate occurs, a new set of expectations governing price formation evolves and the 
exchange rate ceases to be in equilibrium.  
When exchange rates are floating, volatility is often harder to explain. As 
Eichengreen (1999) has observed, “swings in relative real values among the US 
dollar, the Deutsche mark and the Japanese yen have approached 50 per cent or 
more in the past decade and a half. Such swings complicate macroeconomic 
policies, generate the potential for resource misallocation, and gives rise to 
protectionist measures. While it can be argued that exchange markets are 
responding to policy divergences (actual and expected), the link is often not at all 
clear”. 
 
Equity Markets  
Instability in equity markets comprise another potential source of financial 
instability. Stock market instabilities cannot be easily explained by rational 
speculative behaviour. Three standard explanations have been advanced as to 
why stock markets should be particularly prone to instability: (a) speculative 
excesses, (b) instability in macroeconomic policies, and (c) internal market 
dynamics. Any episode of market instability might contain elements of all the 
three explanations in varying degrees. 
Speculative excesses come closest to the Minsky-Kindleberger 
explanation. As memories of the most recent crash wean out of public memory 
and economic recovery causes equity prices to rise, naïve investors jump on the 
bandwagon, intensifying an upward movement. There might be particular sectors 
that are favoured, because of their perceived growth potential. Whatever the 
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contributory causes, a process develops that leads to a bidding-up of asset 
prices. Eventually, reality sets in and prices crash. 
Another potential source of stock market volatility lies in macroeconomic 
instability. Since equity prices represent the present discounted value of a future 
stream of earnings, they will change whenever an event occurs that changes 
either the expected future income stream or the rate at which it is discounted by 
the market. When a major change in economic prospects occur, the prospective 
future shifts in income streams have an effect on the current prices.  
Stock market declines have the potential to affect real economic activity 
through several channels. Firstly, the fall in private sector wealth will have a 
direct effect on willingness to spend out of current income, akin to the ratchet 
effect. Estimates produced at the time of US stock market crash of 1987 
suggested that the negative effects on industrial country output from wealth 
effects would be less than one-half of one percent of GDP (IMF, 1988). 
A second channel through which stock market declines affect real 
economic activity is via their effect on financial intermediaries. If declining equity 
prices reduce the net worth of financial institutions and their customers, they may 
exacerbate asymmetric information problems and lead to a reduction in the level 
of financial intermediation (Mishkin, 1994). This, in turn, would make it harder to 
mobilise funds for productive investment and lead to a cumulative contraction in 
the level of output. 
 
Fixed Interest and Real Asset Markets  
Apart from the exchange market and the stock market, the markets for 
fixed income securities (bonds) and real estate are also important, although they 
have attracted less attention in the literature. The most prominent instance of 
bond market instability occurred in 1994, when long-term bond yields rose 
sharply in most major markets, raising fears that certain financial institutions 
might find themselves in difficulty.  
A second potential source of macroeconomic instability lies in instability in 
the prices of real asset. The effect is more pronounced when the asset 
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concerned is a large component of the private sector’s real wealth, when 
changes in its price affect the profitability of different production technologies and 
when such price movements create generalized inflationary or deflationary 
pressures. The crisis in South-East Asia has been a testimony to the 
consequences of speculative excesses and its impact on real estate markets.  
A third significant source of instability lies in fluctuations in commodity 
prices. The most striking example of this is to be found in two rounds of oil price 
increases in the early and late ‘seventies, and the subsequent decline in real 
energy prices in the past decade. Energy is an important component of the 
production process and significant changes in its cost has an effect both on the 
aggregate cost of production (and therefore on measured inflation) and on the 
relative cost of factor inputs (and therefore, on the choice of production 
technologies).  
 
II C. Fragility in Market Infrastructure 
Payment and Settlement System 
The growth in volume of both domestic and international transactions has 
meant the transfer of an enormous funds across the globe. Such transfers are 
usually effected through the payments and settlements system. Consequently, 
the payments network has become one of the most likely channels of 
transmission of a generalized shock throughout the financial system. Needless to 
mention, most developed countries have switched over to a Real Time Gross 
Settlement (RTGS) system in the face of such vulnerabilities and several others 
have initiated a process of movement towards RTGS.  
At the same time, the phenomenal growth in off-balance sheet (OBS) 
activities of banks, through the use of derivative instruments, has meant that 
credit exposures in settlement systems have increased at a pace much faster 
than real economic activity. In fact, the Report of the U.S. Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that derivatives pose a major threat to 
financial stability and recommended several measures to strengthen government 
regulation and supervision of all participants. The fear of a major bank failure 
 13
because of OTC derivative activities appears to stem from two sources. First, the 
sheer size of banks’ OTC derivative activities suggests that they may be exposed 
to substantial market and credit risks. In particular, there is concern that as OTC 
derivative dealers, banks may be exposed to sizeable counter-party credit risk. 
Such concerns have been heightened in recent times, consequent upon the 
near-bankruptcy of Metallgesellschaft and Barings. Secondly, many fear that 
regulation, as well as managerial sophistication, has lagged developments in the 
derivatives area, and, as a consequence, banks may be taking risks much more 
above the limits of prudence. In the view of several writers (Corrigan, 1996), 
these exposures, which often amount to a multiple of a bank’s capital, have 
become the single biggest threat to the maintenance of stability in the financial 
system. 
 
III. Achieving Financial Stability 
The article has thus far concentrated on some of the reasons as to why 
institutions, markets and the associated infrastructure may be subject to 
instability. It is therefore important to devise policies that can safeguard stability 
in the financial system. In what follows, we first consider approaches aimed at 
improving the stability of financial institutions and next, consider ways in which 
excessive volatility in financial markets can be reduced. The final part of the 
section focuses on mitigating disruptions in market infrastructure. 
 
A. Improving the Functioning of Financial Institutions 
Safety Nets 
It has long been recognized that the particular nature of the banking 
industry makes it imperative that there should exist a lender-of-the-last resort 
(LLR) to provide the assurance of stability under all circumstances. Because 
banks are in the business of enhancing the creditworthiness and the liquidity of 
private financial obligations, they are vulnerable if, for whatever reason, their 
depositors seek early repayment of their claims at the same time. This is the 
argument adduced for the LLR function of the central bank, as a sort of 
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catastrophic insurance coverage that should be used only in situations of 
extreme distress. 
Another type of safety net is implicit or explicit deposit insurance. If 
depositors are insured by an entity of unquestioned creditworthiness, then the 
incentive for sudden withdrawals in the case of any eventuality would stand 
curtailed. In India, a system of deposit insurance was established in the early 
‘sixties and the insurance cover presently stands at Rs. 1 lakh per depositor. 
Although the coverage of deposit insurance varies across countries, one might 
surmise that even in countries that do not have such mechanisms, in case of an 
eventuality, the authorities would take the necessary steps to ensure that the 
losses suffered by retail depositors are minimized. 
Several variants of this approach, among others, a co-insurance fund 
(such as putting a certain percentage of each depositors account at risk) and a 
system of risk-based deposit insurance have been advanced in the literature. 
Although such schemes have the advantage of increasing the monitoring 
incentive of depositors, they nonetheless suffer from implementation problems. 
The general problem of safety net mechanisms is that they exacerbate the 
problem of moral hazard. Not only is it inherently difficult for the lender to control 
the behaviour of an economic agent, incentives might be created that reduce the 
desire of lenders to even attempt such control. If banks believe that they will be 
rescued in cases of illiquidity, they will have fewer incentives to prudently 
manage their portfolios, consequently, their interest in the institution in which they 
place their funds will be that much lower.  
 
Reducing Moral Hazard 
Awareness of the problem of moral hazard has led to a search to mitigate 
its consequences. Several ways of dealing with the problem have been 
discussed in the literature. These include, among others, prudential regulation, 
narrow banking, increased disclosure and transparency and reducing settlement 
risk. We take these up in turn. 
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A time-tested approach to dealing with moral hazard is through regulation. 
The basic justification for bank regulation is that, in its absence, banks might 
accidentally or otherwise indulge in excessive risk-taking, so that even market 
discipline might prove insufficient to prevent this. Several complementary 
reasons have been cited as to why banks might be subject to regulation. These 
include (a) to protect the bank’s customers from loss (consumer protection 
argument), (b) to reduce the incidence of contagion (the systemic risk argument), 
(c) to avoid losses to the deposit insurance fund or the LLR (the fiscal argument), 
and finally, (d) to improve the allocation of resources in the financial system (the 
efficiency argument). 
Two different approaches to bank regulation can be distinguished 
(Goodhart, 1995). The first focuses on controlling the activities that the regulated 
institutions can engage in, the second one focus on ensuring that they are 
adequately capitalized against the risks they run.  
 
Commercial Banks in the Securities Business 
The issue of whether commercial banks should be permitted in the 
securities business and act as universal banks has been debated and discussed 
widely in developed countries like the United States. Following the First World 
War, commercial banks became increasingly involved in the securities 
underwriting business. The principal argument in favour of abolishing the 
separation of commercial and investment banking is that artificial limitations 
constrain the laissez faire configuration of banking. In other words, that 
separation impairs the cross-sectional reusability of information between 
commercial and investment banking and constrains them from reaping the 
economies of scale and scope that they might otherwise enjoy. In a wider sense, 
universal banks which have equity stakes in non-financial entities are said to be 
able to internalize situations of financial distress better than commercial banks 
and securities markets.  
Universal banking is presently being debated in India in view of the 
overlapping of activities between banks and financial institutions. Presently, there 
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are no restrictions on banks’ investments in preference shares/non-convertible 
debentures/bonds of private corporate bodies. Banks are also allowed to invest 
in corporate stocks. However, such investments are restricted to 5 per cent of the 
incremental deposits of the previous year. Banks are also allowed to underwrite 
subject to the limit of 15 per cent of the issue size. In case there are 
devolvements and the aforesaid 5 per cent limit is exceeded, banks are required 
to offload the excess holdings. Banks are also allowed to own 100 per cent 
investment banks and undertake mutual funds activity through separate entities. 
Guidelines have recently also been issued for entry of banks and non-banking 
financial companies into insurance business. 
One of the major motivations for the separation of commercial and 
investment banking both in the 1930s and in present times concerns the potential 
for conflicts of interests. Critics have argued that banks might abuse the trust of 
their customers and take advantage of them by selling low quality securities 
without fully revealing the associated risks. Such behaviour could broadly 
undermine confidence in the market and banks themselves. 
The debt crisis in the early 1980s came close to destabilising the banking 
system in a number of major developed countries, with potentially far-reaching 
consequences. It added weight to the argument for giving a new focus to the 
supervision of financial institutions that would strike a better balance between 
ensuring stability and containing moral hazard. Under the so-called Basle Capital 
Convergence Accord for example, banks were required to hold a certain 
minimum level of capital in relation to the credit risks of their portfolio.  
 
Regulatory Standards 
Risk-based capital requirements have not been without their critics, 
however. Objections have been raised, not so much to the principle of relating 
capital-holding to risk, but to the way risks are measured and the somewhat 
arbitrary process for setting minimum capital levels. The absence of any formal 
mechanism to take into account the risk-reducing properties of a diversified 
portfolio of credit risks has also been questioned. Secondly, the focus in the 
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original Accord on credit risk, to the exclusion of other kinds of risks, was a 
subject of criticism. Thirdly, the rule of ‘one-size-fits-all’ aspect of the capital 
adequacy ratio was also the subject of intense debate and recent crises have 
only drilled home the point that baseline capital adequacy norms are not enough 
of a hedge against failures. In response to such criticism, the Basle Committee 
on Banking Supervision has proposed a Consultative Paper on the new capital 
adequacy framework, based on the three pillars of minimum capital 
requirements, supervisory review process and effective use of market discipline. 
Under the first pillar, the Committee has proposed to build on the extant 
‘minimum regulatory capital requirements’ by announcing explicit risk weighing 
structure for different activities. The second pillar envisages a more pro-active 
role for the regulator by requiring that they ensure that a bank’s capital position is 
consistent with its overall risk profile and strategy, which, in turn, is sought to be 
achieved through supervisory review of bank-specific internal capital assessment 
processes. The third pillar of market discipline seeks to ensure greater levels of 
disclosure and enhance the role of market participants in encouraging greater 
capital holdings by banks (Drage and Mann, 1999).  
Given the growing disenchantment with capital adequacy standards, 
newer approaches to risk measurement are being discussed. These methods 
include a subtly differentiated prudential weighing scheme, Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
models and pre-commitment approach (PCA) have been advocated. The issue of 
differentiated prudential weighing scheme is currently being discussed by 
regulators across the globe. Under the Pre-commitment Approach, a bank itself 
decides how much capital it will hold within a given period to cover risks arising 
from its trading block. Sanctions will apply if the accumulated losses exceed the 
amount. The Value-at-Risk approach has emerged as a major tool for measuring 
market risk and is being used internally by banks for risk management and as a 
regulatory tool for ensuring the soundness of the financial system. However, the 
basic problem with such models lie in (a) obtaining adequate/high-frequency data 
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and, (a) devising a satisfactory way of handling the variability of credit 
exposures.5 
 
Narrow Banking 
Another approach to maintenance of stability that has found support has 
been narrow banking. Advocated by Friedman6 in 1959, it found support in the 
writings of several writers (Litan, 1987). Simply put, it states that a category of 
institutions (‘narrow’ banks) would be authorized to accept deposits that can be 
withdrawn on demand. These banks would be required to continue their 
investments to certain categories of safe assets. However, for one reason or the 
other, the proposal has not found much favour in policy circles.  
 
Disclosure and Transparency 
An approach to improving the functioning of financial entities which has 
gained currency has been reliance on enhanced disclosure standards to enforce 
prudent behaviour. In this, the authorities would make clear that they took no 
responsibility for bailing out distressed financial institutions, in order to stimulate 
more active regulation by the market. Greater transparency, coupled by strict 
disclosure standards, would enable depositors to discriminate between risky and 
less risky banks, and strengthen managerial incentives by making banks 
management more personally accountable when losses occur7. In a recent 
article, Cordella and Yeyeti (1997) have suggested that increased market 
                                                          
 
4 Under PCA, banks choose a level of capital to back their trading books for a given period of time. 
If the cumulative losses of the trading book exceed the chosen cover at any time during the period, 
the banks are penalized, possibly by fines. The chosen capital is thus a ‘pre-commitment’ level, 
beyond which penalties are imposed. This might lead to the problem of over-capitalisation under 
PCA. Under VaR on the other hand, the regulator must try to ensure that the internal model used to 
calculate risk is accurate. Otherwise, banks might misrepresent their risk exposure. This might lead 
to the problem of monitoring under VaR. 
 
5 Friedman’s 100 per cent reserve requirement. 
 
6 King (1999) has suggested a ‘middle way’, based on the principle that if emergency services are 
be slow to arrive, then borrowing countries should have adequate resources on hand to withstand 
any incipient crisis. The five basic tenets of the middle way comprise of (a) self-insurance against a 
liquidity crisis; (b) avoid currency and maturity mismatches; (c) encourage equity flows, as opposed 
to debt flows, backed by a credible legal and institutional infrastructure; (d) encourage incentive 
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discipline through improved transparency is likely to lead to a more stable 
banking system. The intuition is that in the absence of disclosures, depositors 
and other creditors assume that banks will choose riskier positions and that the 
debt (deposits) will be priced accordingly. The solution then is for a bank to take 
riskier options. In contrast, with full disclosure, i.e., with its risk known, the bank 
can take less risky options. As a result, by enhancing market discipline, more 
effective disclosures lead to a more stable banking system.8 
In India, the transparency aspect has been emphasized by expanding the 
coverage, timeliness and analytical content of the information provided in various 
publications by the supervisory authorities. The authorities have also mandated 
disclosure of some of the essential strength indicators and performance-related 
parameters as part of the ‘Notes on Accounts’ in the annually published accounts 
of banks.  
 
Statistical Indicators of Instability 
In an influential study, Goldstein (1997) has documented the best and 
worst performing indicators of banking and currency crises in developed, 
developing and emerging market economies. The conclusions are summarised in 
Table 2. 
As Goldstein (1997) cogently argues, the better leading indicators seem to 
anticipate correctly somewhere between 80 and 100 per cent of the banking and 
currency crises over the period 1970-1995, and that ‘…the leading indicators that 
show the best forecasting accuracy also tend on average to send the earliest and 
most persistent signals of banking and currency crises’. However, ‘ …banking 
crises appear to be somewhat harder to forecast accurately than currency 
crises’. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
compatible debt contracts between creditors and debtors in case of difficulties; and, (e) avoid fixed 
exchange rates, when they are no longer consistent with internal and external equilibrium. 
 
7 Mention needs to be made in this context of New Zealand’s approach to regulation through 
greater emphasis on market discipline through public disclosures by banks, increasing the 
accountability of bank directors and management and reducing the extent of prudential regulation 
(Brash, 1997). 
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Table 2: Currency and Banking Crises: Best vs Worst Performing 
Indicators 
 Currency Crises 
Indicators 
Banking Crises Indicators 
BEST Real Exchange Rate Real Exchange Rate 
Banking Crisis Equity Prices 
Exports M2 Multiplier 
Equity Prices Real Output 
M2/International Reserves Real rate of interest on 
deposits 
Real Output Exports 
WORST Terms-of-trade International Reserves 
Domestic/foreign interest 
rate differential 
Terms-of-trade 
Imports Excess real M1 balances 
Lending interest rate/ 
Deposit interest rate 
Lending interest rate/Deposit 
interest rate 
Bank Deposits Imports 
Source: Goldstein (1997) 
 
Needless to say, this is one area that has witnessed an explosion of 
research. Recent work in this area, including Frankel and Rose (1996) and 
Honohan (1997) have emphasized the important role of foreign borrowings, 
particularly short-term liabilities denominated in foreign currency, to measure the 
degree of exposure to currency and inflation risks. The recent literature also 
focuses on the level of non-performing loans (NPLs)-studies such as Gonzalez-
Hermosillo (1999) shows empirical evidence that the CAMELS-type assessment 
is statistically significant only if NPLs and capital adequacy are simultaneously 
considered9. Other indicators to capture financial vulnerability include a measure 
of segmentation (proxied by inter-bank interest rate differential), the deposits to 
M2 ratrio and aggregate stock indices. In surveying literature on these indicators, 
Demirgic-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) point to criticisms on the use of CAMELS 
based criteria to measure bank strength10. Subsequently, Gonzalez-Hermosillo 
(1997), using both micro and macro factors in explaining banking fragility 
                                                          
 
8 Non-performing loans may be of particular relevance, as they give an indication of risks to capital 
adequacy from future write-offs (Davis, 1999). 
 
9 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) show that currency crises are often preceded or accompanied by 
banking crises. 
 21
concludes that the introduction of macro variables significantly improves the 
explanatory power of models based on micro-prudential indicators only.  
The IMF, in a recent study on financial sector surveillance, has identified a 
set of macro-prudential indicators. These are categorised under two broad 
categories (a) aggregated micro-prudential indicators and (b) indicators of 
macroeconomic developments. However, the number of indicators included 
under these two heads is extremely large, numbering more than fifty and as the 
paper aptly recognises, it compromises on the principle of parsimony. It is 
therefore suggested that there is the need to develop a smaller and manageable 
set of indicators, primarily for purposes of periodic monitoring and data 
dissemination11,12. 
Empirical research in this area is in a state of flux and with 
hindsight, one might hazard a guess that much rigorous analysis is called 
for before one can predict with a reasonable degree of certainty the early 
warning indicators of such crises. 
 
B. Improving the Functioning of Financial Markets 
Excessive volatility in asset prices can also have adverse macroeconomic 
consequences. Therefore, policy makers have a responsibility in ensuring that 
undesirable price volatility is not generated by their own macroeconomic policies 
or by the microstructure of financial markets. 
 
Dealing with Asset Price Instability 
It is possible to distinguish two sorts of price instabilities. One is the result 
of unnecessary variability in the underlying determinants of asset prices. Such 
                                                          
 
10 Davis (1999) has outlined the types of financial data required for macro-prudential surveillance. 
As Davis observes, the essential point is to seek to detect emerging patterns of financial stability in 
advance and guage their gravity when they occur by observing the overall pattern of economic and 
financial developments in a judgemental manner, informed by the events of the past that have 
entailed systemic risks, and with a broad conceptual framework derived from theory to identify 
appropriate danger signals (italics in original). 
 
11 Patra and Roy (1999) have attempted to delineate the optimum thresholds of financial stability in 
India for the period 1970/71-1997/98. The variables used in their setup include (a) Real GDP 
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variability might often reflect ‘out-of-equilibrium’ behaviour, consequent upon 
certain policy dilemmas or certain policy inconsistencies elsewhere in the 
system. Price instability in such cases often act a signaling device, necessitating 
the need for remedial policy actions to bring them in line with other sets of 
domestic policies. A second sort of instability arises from imperfections in the 
price discovery mechanism (such as asset bubbles or over-shooting).  
Asset price instability linked to macro-economic policies developments is 
probably the more important, but there is less to be said about it. Clearly, the 
answer lies in the pursuit of policies that are mutually consistent and sustainable 
over time. This has become all the more important with the growing of global 
capital markets and the development of new financial instruments.   
Although markets have become more powerful in ensuring that financial 
prices ultimately reflect fundamental economic determinants, they do not always 
do so in a smooth way. Lags in perceptions may mean that disequilibrium can 
exist for a while, perhaps because market opinion is divided about whether or not 
the situation is indeed sustainable, before corrective forces asset themselves. 
Then, of course, the risk is that the needed price adjustment will be more sudden 
and disruptive than it would have been had corrective action been taken earlier. 
 
Enhancing Stability in Foreign Exchange Market 
In the foreign exchange market, two kinds of measures have been 
advocated to promote stability. First is the choice of an exchange rate regime. 
The other is through policies to make the chosen exchange rate regime function 
as smoothly as possible. 
The question of what is the best exchange rate regime necessary to 
reduce unwanted stability has attracted much attention over the years. The 
practical dilemma facing the monetary authorities has been formalized in terms of 
the ‘inconsistent quartet’: the fact that the four objectives of stable exchange 
rates, an independent monetary policy, free trade and full capital mobility cannot 
all be simultaneously pursued.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
growth, (b) inflation rate, (c) international reserves, (d) money multiplier and (e) export growth (in 
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Dealing with Currency Crises 
Greater integration of global capital markets has had the consequence of 
giving rise to currency crises. There are three broad approaches that have been 
discussed in the literature that can be pursued when crises occur. Firstly, to 
organize a financial rescue; secondly, to allow events to take their own course, 
accepting the possibility of an excessive depreciation and/or default on external 
debt and thirdly, to arrange a rescheduling and re-negotiation of existing claims. 
Each of these approaches have their respective merits and drawbacks. 
A financial rescue can limit the adverse effects on real living standards 
and help to limit the contagion effects elsewhere. If the financial support is based 
on appropriate conditions, it can also contribute to the adoption of corrective 
macroeconomic policies. On the flip side of the coin, the expectation that the 
international community will provide emergency assistance in the event of 
extreme debt-servicing difficulties risks worsening moral hazard. The 
experiences of South-East Asia have shown that emergency assistance on a 
significant scale might often be difficult to garner, with severe difficulties for the 
future debt-servicing capability of the economy. 
Allowing market forces to chart their own route avoids the problem of 
moral hazard and in the end probably makes economic agents-borrowing 
governments and external lenders-more cautious. The downside is that a laissez 
faire approach would involve larger costs in those crises that did nevertheless 
occur. The costs in terms of lost output and inflationary pressure would be higher 
than in circumstances where international assistance was available in support of 
a well-designed adjustment programme. 
The demerits of both the financial rescue as well as the laissez faire 
approach have led to a search for alternative ways of dealing with sovereign 
liquidity crises. An approach that has been advocated in the literature has been 
the re-schedulement/re-negotiation of loans. Such an approach has obvious 
attractions, but has its pitfalls too. For one, legal frameworks differ so much 
                                                                                                                                                                             
dollars). 
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across countries that it would be well nigh impossible to agree on a common 
approach at the sovereign level. For another, the ultimate sanction as in 
domestic bankruptcy proceedings, the take-over and liquidation of the debtor 
entity is not available at the sovereign level.  
 
Equity and Bond Markets 
When movements in equity and bond prices are large enough, they might 
often pose a serious threat to financial stability. To avoid this, supervisors of 
financial institutions seek to ensure that firms hold sufficient capital and liquidity 
to meet unforeseen market conditions. If individual institutions are well-
capitalized, the authorities can feel more confident about providing temporary 
liquidity assistance in times of exceptional market stress. Another way to ensure 
stability of markets is by addressing some of the underlying factors that make for 
excessive price volatility. Non-financial firms in countries with high and variable 
inflation tend to be vulnerable to economic shocks, because their debt tends to 
be of short duration and denominated in foreign currency. A low and steady rate 
of inflation allows countries to write long-term debt contracts. Highly variable 
inflation also reduces the credibility of policy makers, making it difficult to 
promote recovery from crisis. At the macro-economic level, this means avoiding 
abrupt changes in policy that cause economic agents to re-assess the value of 
debt and equity instruments. Such abrupt changes might be deemed as 
necessary when a unsustainable situation has been allowed to persist for long 
and an initial corrective move on the part of the authorities is perceived as 
heralding a turning point.  
 
Real Estate 
Price instability in the real estate market is a legitimate source of concern 
and has prompted consideration in some countries as to how it can be reduced. 
So long as real estate prices move pro-cyclically, they are liable to exacerbate 
the cycle by increasing borrowing and spending in the inflationary phase and 
adding to financial fragility, thus reducing spending, in the contractionary phase. 
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One approach is for financial supervision to encourage banks to limit the extent 
to which real estate collateral can be used for loans.  
 
C. Improving the Financial Market Infrastructure 
Reducing Settlement Risk 
If difficulties at one institution were to threaten systemic stability, one of 
the most likely channels of transmission would be through the payments and 
settlement system. The growth of financial transactions generally means that 
financial intermediaries find themselves with increasingly large, though very 
short-term credit exposures in the payments system. At the same time, given the 
complexity and unpredictability of inter-bank payments flows, it becomes 
extremely difficult for financial institutions to form a view of the indirect exposures 
that they face through the settlement position of their counter-parties vis-a-vis 
others.  
Recently, Litan (1997) has forcefully argued for moving towards Real Time 
Gross Settlement (RTGS) as a means to improve the safety of clearing and 
settlement systems. Introduction of RTGS is expected to lower the risk of one 
party having insufficient funds at settlement time. In fact, several authors have 
unanimously agreed that moving towards shorter settlement times in all markets 
would make an important contribution to financial stability. Realizing the 
significance that an efficient market infrastructure can have on financial stability, 
efforts are underway in countries like India in moving towards a Real Time Gross 
Settlement (RTGS) system with a view to minimizing transactions costs and 
improving market efficiency. 
 
Improving Legal Framework 
Another aspect of market infrastructure which has received scant attention 
in the literature is the legal framework. In developing and transition economies, 
there is often a basic need for workable laws on contract, collateral and 
bankruptcy proceedings, as well as the need to streamline court proceedings for 
rapid and effective remedy. But the issue also extends to developed legal and 
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judicial systems, because the continual state of innovation and evolution of new 
financial products can outrun existing legislation and raise finer points of law.  
 
Corporate Governance 
The strand of market infrastructure which is often been ignored in policy 
discussions is the issue of corporate governance. Corporate governance in its 
wide connotation covers a variety of aspects, such as protection of shareholders’ 
rights, enhancing shareholders value, Board issues including its composition and 
role, disclosure requirements, integrity of accounting practices and internal 
control systems (Reddy, 1999). Pertinent from the point of view of the present 
exercise is corporate governance in the financial sector. The issue has widely 
been discussed and debated in India in recent times, in view of the dominant 
share of the State in the banking sector. In the face of tighter prudential 
standards, it is essential that these institutions have sufficient capital and 
continue to grow. They should be in a position to put in place and assure the 
market that their system of corporate governance is such that they can be trusted 
with shareholders money.  
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
There is overwhelming evidence that financial stability provides a conducive 
environment for efficient resource allocation and rapid economic growth (King 
and Levine, 1993). Instability has often lead to lower levels of savings and 
investment, engendered fiscal costs and setbacks to growth. It is therefore but 
imperative that securing stability should be an important concern of public policy 
authorities. 
The integration of international capital markets and the globalisation of 
major financial institutions has made the objective of maintaining financial 
stability increasingly important, but overtly complex. The network of financial 
relationships that link financial firms and markets together has meant that the 
potential for difficulties arising in a single firm, market or payment system to 
spread elsewhere have become manifold.  
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In response to an initiative at the Lyon Summit in June 1996, 
representative of G-10 countries and of emerging economies have jointly sought 
to develop a strategy for fostering financial stability. The key components of the 
strategy, as identified by the representatives consisted of (a) an international 
consensus on the key elements of a sound financial system; (b) formulation of 
norms and practices at par with international best practice; (c) use of market 
discipline for adoption of sound supervisory systems and better corporate 
governance. 
Subsequently, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) have been 
making pro-active efforts to strengthen the architecture of the international 
financial system. Accordingly, three key areas for policy action viz., enhancing 
transparency and accountability, strengthening domestic financial systems and 
managing financial crises, have been identified as priority areas for policy action. 
The Working Group on Transparency and Accountability has stressed the need 
to improve the coverage, frequency and timeliness of macro data; the Working 
Group on Strengthening Financial Systems identified several key areas including 
corporate governance, risk management and safety net arrangements to fortify 
the global financial architecture; the Working Group on International Financial 
Crises emphasized the necessity for better risk management by the public and 
private sectors and recommended a framework for orderly debt workouts 
between creditors and debtors and guiding principles for resolution of future 
crises. In this context, White (1999) has observed that Central Banks are 
devoting considerable amount of resources to the issue of financial stability than 
a decade or so earlieri. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also been making serious 
efforts in promoting information disclosure in international markets through 
various channels. Firstly, the IMF has been preparing comprehensive analytical 
and descriptive reports on economic developments in its member countries for its 
executive board and for all member governments. Second, the IMF has been 
producing regular statistical publications. Thirdly, since the 1995 Mexican crisis, 
the IMF has posted market-relevant data on the Internet through its Special Data 
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Dissemination Standard (SDDS) and its associated Dissemination Standards 
Bulletin Board. At the 1995 Halifax Summit, in recognition of the 
recommendations of the G-7 Governments, the IMF developed a mechanism for 
faster access to IMF credit and larger amounts of money to countries in crisis 
situations. Consequently, the emergency financing mechanism was established 
wherein funds could be disbursed to crisis-riddled economies in a shorter period 
of time. 
In an increasingly deregulated world, wherein most emerging market 
economies have been encompassing deregulation in varying degrees, one 
aspect of stability which has largely bypassed the attention of observers has 
been the issue of timing and sequencing of reforms. It has been noted by several 
observers (Khatkhate, 1998, Harwood and Smith, 1998) that financial sector 
reform has a certain sequencing pattern built into it, which varies according to 
characteristics specific to each country. The sequencing of reforms that takes 
into account the institutional imperatives has a better chance to succeed and 
avoid disruptions to the financial system. Experience is indicative of the fact that 
even with all the sequencing and timing problems resolved, financial sector 
reforms needs to be preceded by the real sector reforms, good corporate 
governance, a firm control of the fiscal deficit as well as consistent macro-
economic policies. As Khatkhate (1998) has aptly summarized it ‘…the structural 
and macro-economic policies should be delicately balanced and interwoven, with 
space for adjustment…’. 
Recent theoretical work has greatly increased understanding of the forces 
making for instability in the financial system. We no longer need to rely on 
phychological explanations as to why bank runs occur or why financial prices 
move by more than what is justified on the basis of underlying economic 
fundamentals. This understanding of the microeconomics of financial market 
behaviour is an important part of the policymakers tool-kit in the search for a 
system that is stable enough to facilitate inter-temporal resource allocation 
decisions, yet flexible enough to allow prices and institutional structures to adapt 
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through time, and to provide a proper range of incentives for good decisions and 
penalties for bad decisions.  
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